Waterloo, the Napoleonic wars and the recasting of the global Iberian world

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ABSTRACT: By bringing the Napoleonic wars to an end, the battle of Waterloo gave the last impetus to a nightmarish political juggernaut that in little over a decade managed to dislocate a centuries-old global Iberian world. To a limited extent, it was also a contributing factor in unleashing an era of civil war that resulted in the secession of most of the Spanish American dominions and in an ideological battleground between conservative and progressive, centralists and autonomic forces. Portugal fared no better, troubled by domestic crises and the eventual unravelling of the Lusitanian Empire through the emergence of an independent Brazil.

Twenty-four hours after receiving a royal decree signed in Madrid on 3 July 1815, all churches under the jurisdiction of the Spanish Monarchy – the tri-continental realm that extended from the Mediterranean to cover much of the Americas and the Philippines in Asia – were expected to perform a *Te Deum* in thanks for the 'extremely important and very marked victory obtained over the common enemy' in the battle of Waterloo on 18 June.[1] The royal command, issued to guarantee an immediate public expression of gratitude, encapsulated the prevailing hope in the Spanish establishment that the concluding campaign of the Napoleonic wars would somehow serve to put the genie back in the bottle, [2] instantly erasing a web of complex processes that in little over a decade managed to dislocate a centuries-old global Iberian world. In this article it will be suggested that far from achieving this goal, the battle of Waterloo constituted the element that was missing to complete a nightmarish political juggernaut. It was also, to a limited extent, a contributing factor in unleashing over two decades of civil war in the Spanish Monarchy that would result in the secession of most of the Americas and in an ideological battleground between conservative and progressive, centralists and autonomic forces. Neighbouring Portugal fared little better, both in terms of domestic crises and the eventual unravelling of the Lusitanian Empire through the emergence of an independent Brazil.

Since his ascent to power in 1799, Napoleon felt under the constant shadow of Britain. [4] At the time, Spain was a French ally, while Portugal was a neutral power with long-recognised British sympathies. The naval defeat at Trafalgar in October 1805 ended Napoleon's hope of beating the British at their own game. It did not destroy, as it is widely believed, the Spanish navy which remained the third largest in number of ships of the line (lost ten of forty-two) and

strong enough to fight the Royal Navy in thirty-five different scenarios during the following two years, including twenty-seven actions with positive outcomes for the Spaniards.[5] Anglo-Spanish confrontations also took place on land. On 27 June 1806 a British force of 1,500 men under William Carr Beresford attempted to gain control of the River Plate – a large estuary between what is now Argentina and Uruguay – by conquering the dominant city, Buenos Aires. They succeeded in controlling the town for about six weeks, but finally had to surrender to a force mainly composed of creole militia led by Santiago de Liniers y Bremond, a French nobleman at the service of Spain. In an unprecedented move, he was appointed as viceroy by the locals to replace the peninsular-appointed incumbent who had fled. A second invasion followed in 1807, under Lieutenant-General John Whitelocke. After losing more than half of their force in street fighting, the British signed a ceasefire on 7 July and left for home, where Whitelocke was court-martialled and discharged.[6] The attempt to weaken the Spanish Monarchy by seizing a strategic part of its territory in the Americas had been neutralized.

The global Iberian world, nonetheless, remained under threat – now from unforeseen quarters. In November 1806, Napoleon issued the Berlin Decrees establishing the so-called 'Continental System' – a scheme destined to stop all trade of British goods into Europe. A year later, in Milan, he tightened the grip by ordering all allies of France, as well as all countries who wanted to be considered neutral, to cease trade with the British – continuing his attempt to clearly divide Europe into two clear-cut camps by painting those that did not comply with France' demands as France's enemies.[7] Portugal became the most obvious potential hole in Napoleon's continental dyke. Consequently, the Emperor demanded the closure of Portugal's ports to British ships, the confiscation of British merchandise, and the arrest of British subjects. Lisbon complied with the first demand, but balked at the second and third. France raised the stakes, insisting on garrisoning and commanding Portugal's coastal fortresses. At the same time, secretly, Napoleon negotiated a treaty with the Spanish king Charles IV of the Bourbon family (the Treaty of Fontainebleau) by which they agreed to partition the Portuguese world – Spain was to seize Portugal and Portuguese America while France was to control their trade routes in Africa and Asia. It was then that Britain issued Portugal's Prince Regent Joao with an ultimatum to either renew treaty obligations and evacuate Lisbon for Rio de Janeiro in Brazil, or else be abandoned and witness its fleet burned by the Royal Navy – a repeat of Britain's performance just months earlier in Copenhagen's harbour, to prevent the seizure and use of its warships by the French.[8] The Portuguese were left in an impossible situation. Either support Napoleon and have their fleet – by implication their livelihood – destroyed by Britain or support Britain and

start a war with Napoleon. Word of movement of French troops in the Pyrenees pushed them towards the British option. Prince Regent Joao was thus forced to preside over the largest transoceanic migration of an imperial capital in history: from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro. A court of nearly 15,000 people set sail on 29 November 1807.[9] This extraordinary exodus was to have a crucial impact on future developments, not just for the history of Portugal and Brazil, but also for the conduct of the rest of the Napoleonic conflict.

Rumours about movement of troops in the Franco-Spanish frontier were well-founded. On 20 October 1807, 25,000 French troops were indeed seen crossing the Pyrenees. They had been invited to traverse Spanish territory on the way to conquer Portugal by the terms of the above mentioned Treaty of Fontainebleau.[10] Such was the trust that the Spanish Bourbons had placed in France, their traditional ally, that the incursion went ahead nine days before the document was formally signed (27 October 1807). Alas, for reasons historians are still debating, but that seem to revolve around the fact that confidence was not mutual, Napoleon decided to renege on the deal.[11] Soon imperial forces secured key ports in Catalonia and the Basque country, including four important fortresses. What neither the Bourbons nor Napoleon had predicted was the hostile reception French troops were to receive in many places during the following months. Revolts sprung up in Pamplona and Burgos; two French soldiers were murdered in Vitoria and over a hundred were seriously wounded in clashes with the inhabitants of poor neighbourhoods of Barcelona who, primitive as they may have been in the eyes of the invaders, were bright enough to ponder why the French would want to install themselves in the Mediterranean coast if their target was Portugal.[12] These episodes have been obscured in much of the historiography because they took place amid a domestic political crisis with which they were probably entangled and confused. Tainted by years of government inefficiency, corruption and personal scandal, the man who had negotiated the secret treaty with Napoleon, the *válido* (prime minister) Manuel de Godoy had become a target for hatred. Rumours that the King and his wife were to be spirited away to the safety of South America – emulating the experience of the Portuguese royal family – triggered a mutiny at Aranjuez on 17–19 March 1808 that not only unseated Godoy, but also placed the monarch´s son, the untested Ferdinand VII, on the throne.

With all the difficulties encountered in Spain, the French had, nonetheless, arrived in Portugal in November 1807, finding little resistance in their way to Lisbon which they soon occupied. In February 1808 their commander, Jean-Andoche Junot, declared Joao and the Braganza dynasty deposed and took over the ruling of the country, mainly by seeking support from local *afrancesados* – sympathisers of the Napoleonic regime. However, this group was not

sizeable enough and Junot was forced to govern over an increasingly restless populace. Risings in Porto, Minho and Algarve took place at the same time as ordinary Spaniards were expressing hostility against French forces that remained on Spanish soil – indeed, one French commander suspected the existence of a co-ordinated luso-hispanic action against them.[13] Although this was probably paranoia more than anything else, the fact that the French felt unwelcome in Iberia from the start contributed to create a siege mentality that influenced their war decisions. Meanwhile, London could not allow Portugal to remain in French hands with the support of the Spanish Bourbons.[14] That would have left Britain without access to the European continent and endangered all her trading global routes. In January 1808, Whitehall began assembling 9,000 troops at Cork to engage in a 'liberating' invasion of Spanish Venezuela to be led by Sir Arthur Wellesley. He was to be accompanied by the campaigner of South American independence Francisco de Miranda, who had already launched a similar attempt a little over a year earlier – the Leander expedition that ended in spectacular failure because of lack of local support.[15] In 1806, there was no appetite for independence in Spanish America. To defeat Napoleon, Britain was now prepared to open that appetite by force.[16]

While this was happening, Napoleon invited Charles IV, disgruntled at having been ousted by his son, for discussions at Bayonne, seemingly to mediate a family reconciliation.[17] Similar invitations were issued to Ferdinand VII and the rest of the household. So enamoured was the Spanish regime with the might of the French Emperor that the majority of the members of the ruling cabinet – the Council of Castile – followed them in procession to the French side of the frontier. By early May, not hearing from them, it seemed clear that the Bourbons were being kidnapped. It was soon after the last member of the family, the fourteen-year old *infante* (prince) Francisco de Paula departed the capital that the legendary popular rising of *Dos de Mayo* (Second of May) took place to be callously suppressed by Marshall Joachim Murat. Goya's *Third of May* painting depicts one of the many executions carried out after the French seized Madrid; its fame is well-deserved for epitomising the spirit of Spanish defiance that spread as fire not just within Iberia but throughout the whole of the Hispanic world.

To gain an understanding of the nature and global reach of this reaction, it is necessary to bear in mind that for nearly two hundred years, the Spanish Monarchy had been the largest single polity in the world. In Europe, as an integral part of the Holy Roman Empire, it once controlled the Netherlands, many of the German states, Portugal and Italy. Although these territories had been lost by the end of the eighteenth century, in the Napoleonic era the Spanish Monarchy still held a good part of North America, most of Central and South America and the

Philippines. Crucially, the term 'Spanish Monarchy' did not allude only to the system of government - it was the name of the supranational socio-economic, cultural and political entity that encompassed all these territories in three continents (four if the African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla were to be factored in).[18] Except as a cartographical reference, 'Spain' did not yet exist. It is also worth noting that the Spanish world had a long tradition of independent communes dating back to the early Middle Ages. These communes soon established alliances that were held together in the person of single seigneurs, princes or kings – such as those of Asturias, Aragon and Castile – whose kingdoms eventually converged to give life to the Catholic Spanish Crown with a single monarch. In juridical terms, the Americas were an integral part of the kingdom of Castile. This explains why Castilian was, and remains, the main language of that part of the world. Catalans, Basques, Dutch, Germans and Italians who during many decades were also subjects of the Spanish monarch could travel, reside and work in the Americas, but they had to operate under Castilian law and use the Castilian language as their main means of communication.[19]

Therefore, news of Napoleon's seizure of the Spanish Bourbon family could not but shake much of the world as an earthquake. Wellesley's expedition to Spanish Venezuela was diverted to Portugal. The imprisonment of Ferdinand VII also raised the question of the constitution of the Spanish Monarchy. Had the king been killed, the problem would have probably been simpler to resolve: kingship would have fallen to the next in the line of succession. With the king alive, the issue was who else could play his part – *ad interim* – in the constitutional arrangement that had organised the Hispanic world for more than three hundred years. A scheme for short-term emergencies had been devised by the Castilian medieval Law of *Partidas*, which called for the formation of local governments by 'magistrates, priests, rich men and other good and honest men'.[21] Consequently, in the wake of the collapse of the central administration, civil juntas took control of the government in all the Spanish dominions. Even in Catalonia, with Barcelona already occupied by the French, juntas were organised in the towns of Lerida, Manresa, Tortosa, Villafranca del Panades and Gerona. By the end of June, all were united under a General Junta of the Principality of Catalonia. Similar was the situation in the rest of the Hispanic world. All these bodies – from the junta of Manila to the ones in Buenos Aires, Caracas, Oviedo and Seville – claimed to exercise sovereign power directly on behalf of Ferdinand VII as the embodiment of the Spanish monarchy.[22] Crucially, almost all of these juntas raised their own armies.[23]

Popular resistance against Napoleon often expressed itself violently – its grass-roots nature exemplified in the rising of Second May and the sieges of Zaragoza and Gerona. It was during these years that Spaniards gave to the modern world two terms: *guerrilla* and liberalism.[24] In polite circles people had begun to talk about a state of 'revolution' rather than about a state of 'war'. Among the Spanish Patriots there were a few who saw the conflict not just in terms of a struggle for self-determination and against the tyranny of Napoleon, but against all sorts of tyrannies, including those at home. This view was to express itself in concrete terms with the 'Political Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy', better known as the Cadiz Constitution of 1812 and rightly described by the historian Raymond Carr as the Liberal Codex of the early 19th century.[25] Many Spaniards, however, failed to see the need for political reform, at least at this point, and those who did were unsatisfied with the outcome. When Napoleon had his brother Joseph placed on the throne in Madrid he had also dispatched agents to the Americas to convince the Spanish overseas dominions to come back to the fold. By 1810 some American juntas had already begun to demand autonomy within the Spanish Monarchy; a year later, a few even called for secession from a Spanish Patriot regime that seemed doomed to collapse. None, still, ever sided with the French.[26]

For Napoleon this was a terrible failure. It implied leaving in the hands of his enemies open access to human and material resources to wage war against his empire indefinitely. Because the 'Spanish war of independence' (as the Peninsular War is still called in Spain) became the struggle of Spanish Americans, Spanish Filipinos and Spanish Europeans against the imperial regime that had deprived them of the factor that amalgamated the Hispanic world – their Catholic monarch. Moreover, while Joao governed Brazil and controlled African and Asian affairs from Rio de Janeiro,[27] Portugal was practically left in the hands of the British commander of the Portuguese army, who became a de facto viceroy. This was none other than the man who had led the first failed invasion of Buenos Aires, William Carr Beresford. Under his influence, Portugal was turned into little more than a barrack-state. All human and material resources were directed to the war effort. The last French incursion into Portugal by Marshal André Masséna was repelled when Wellesley retreated behind the lines of Torres Vedras, an impregnable system of defence works he made to build. By March 1811, the French were definitely expelled from Portugal.[28] Victory, sadly, came at a heavy price. In four years of war, Portugal's population declined by fifteen per cent out of a total of around two million and the economic infrastructure was dilapidated, particularly the country's roads –never particularly good to begin with – were seriously damaged, becoming obstacles to commercial activity. Worst, Joao had no plans to

return to Portugal – indeed, he did not do so until almost a decade later, following a liberal revolution in Lisbon in 1820, and leaving his heir Pedro as regent in Rio de Janeiro. In 1822, Pedro declared Brazil independent.

The situation in the Hispanic world was far more tortuous. Surrender of the last French troops on Spanish territory only took place when Napoleon was already on his way to Elba, on19 May 1814).[29] After six years of pitched battles and ruthless insurgency, Spaniards were left deeply traumatised, physically and psychologically exhausted. A sense that peace was in some way unreachable lingered, regardless of international treaties, only to be magnified by Napoleon's Hundred Days (20 March to 8 July 1815).[30] Since 1810, encouraged by the experience of self-rule during the British invasions, Buenos Aires had cut all relations with the Peninsula and, while not declaring independence, waged war against loyalist Montevideo, which eventually fell under its control in May 1814. So by the time Ferdinand VII returned to his throne, Buenos Aires and Montevideo had already been lost for good. The same seemed likely to occur with Chile that from September 1810 had also cut off relations with the Peninsula. However, an expedition dispatched from Lima defeated Chilean and Argentine forces in the battle of Rancagua (2 October 1814) and Chile remained within the Spanish Monarchy for a further three years. In 1815, therefore, the hope of returning to the *status quo ante bellum* transmitted between the lines of the Spanish royal decree regarding Waterloo was not wholly unreasonable. Yet it was already telling that the sole representatives of the Spanish army in that battle, General Miguel Ricardo de Alava and Captain Nicolás de Minuisir, merited no mention in that text or in any other official communication - an omission attributable to their liberal sympathies.[35] Political disunity was to become a constant feature of Spanish life for years to come. That the Spanish Monarchy would end up beleaguered and reduced to the status of a medium-size European power with small Caribbean dominions and just a foothold in Asia may not have been inevitable,[36] but it was certainly predictable. By bringing the Napoleonic wars to an end, victory at Waterloo made possible the demobilization of thousands of British soldiers who then looked for employment in other theatres of war, including those of rebellious Spanish America. In that continent they were to play important roles in various emancipatory campaigns,[37] albeit defying Whitehall's stubborn respect for the integrity of the Spanish Monarchy, a policy based on the mistaken belief that trade concession could be gained from the restored Bourbon regime in return for non-interference. Britain's official position did not change for many years – this to such an extent that a royal proclamation in 1817 barred Britons from joining the rebel armies of Spanish America. The prohibition became law in 1819 as the Foreign

Enlistment Act.[38] It was not until 1824, that Britain finally made the first move to recognize the independence of the new Latin American republics.[39] The die, however, had been cast almost a decade earlier in the muddy battlefields of Belgium.

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Notes

[1] Archivo Histórico Nacional (Spain) Consejos, L. 1405, Exp. 319: *Real orden relativa a la celebración en todos los templos del reino de un tedéum en acción de gracias por la victoria de las tropas aliadas sobre las de Napoleón en Waterloo el 18 de junio de 1815*.

[2] Raymond Carr, *Spain 1808-1975* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 118-25.

[4] See Michael Broers, *Napoleon Soldier of Destiny* (London: Faber & Faber, 2014); Philip Dwyer, *Napoleon: the path to power, 1769-1799* (London: Bloomsbury, 2007); Alexander Grab, *Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003).

[5] Agustín R. Rodríguez González, 'Los españoles en Trafalgar: navíos, cañones, hombres y una alianza problemática', in Alberto Ramos, Agustín Guimerá Ravina, Gonzalo Butrón (eds.), *Trafalgar y el Mundo Atlántico* (Madrid: Marcial Ponce, 2004), pp. 212–13; José Gregorio Cayuela Fernández, Ángel Antonio Pozuelo Reina, 'Trafalgar y la desconexión hispana del Atlántico', in Victor Peralta Ruiz, Agustín Guimerá Ravina (eds), *El Equilibrio de los Imperios: de Utrecht a Trafalgar* (Madrid: Fundación Española de Historia Moderna, 2005), pp. 846–48.

[6] See John Lynch, 'British Policy and Spanish America, 1783-1808', *Journal of Latin American Studies* (Vol. 1, No. 1, 1969), pp. 1–30; *Trial of Lieutenant-General John Whitelocke, commander-in-chief of the expedition against Buenos Aires, taken verbatim by a student of Middle Tem*ple (London, 1808).

[7] Among the many works on this subject, see Katherine B. Aaslestad. and J. Joor (eds.), *Revisiting Napoleon's Continental System: Local, Regional and European Experiences* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Pierre Branda, 'Did the War Pay for the War? An assessment of Napoleon's attempts to make his Campaigns self-financing,' *Napoleonica La*

Revue (No.3, 2008), pp. 2-15; Aaslestad, K. B. and Joor, J. (eds.), *Revisiting Napoleon's Continental System: Local, Regional and European Experiences* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

[8] See Thomas Munch-Petersen, *Defying Napoleon: How Britain Bombarded Copenhagen and Seized the Danish Fleet in 1807* (Stroud: Sutton, 2007); A. N. Ryan, 'The Causes of the British Attack upon Copenhagen in 1807', *The English Historical Review*, (Vol. 68, Nr. 266, 1953), pp. 37-55.

[9] See Michael Broers, *Europe under Napoleon 1799-1815* (2nd edition, London: I.B.Tauris, 2015), pp. 152–56; Gabriel Paquette, *Imperial Portugal in the Age of Atlantic Revolutions: The Luso-Brazilian World, c. 1770-1850* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 88–89.

[10] Charles J. Esdaile, *The Peninsular War: a new history* (London: Allen Lane, 2002), pp. 7-8, 24, 31.

[11] See Grab, *Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe*, p. 126.

[12] Jean René Aymes, Claude Morange, Gérard Brey, Annie Lacour, Albert Dérozier, *La Révolution française: ses conséquences et les réactions du 'public' en Espagne entre 1808 et 1814* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1989), p. 29; Juan Pérez de Guzmán y Gallo, *El Dos de Mayo de 1808 en Madrid* (Madrid: Establecimiento Tipográfico Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1908), pp. 227–28, 277–83, 613–14; Emilio de Diego García, 'El problema de los abastecimientos durante la guerra', in José Luis Martínez Sanz and Emilio de Diego García (eds.), *El comienzo de la Guerra de la Independencia – Congreso Internacional del Bicentenario* (Madrid: Editorial Actas, 2009), pp. 297–98.

[13] Paul-Charles-François Thiébault, *Relation de l'expédition du Portugal: faite en 1807 et 1808, par le 1er corps d'observation de la Gironde, devenu armée de Portugal* (Paris: Chez Magimel, Anselin et Pochard, 1817), p. 11.

[14] Rory Muir, *Britain and the defeat of Napoleon 1807-1815* (London: Yale University Press, 1996), pp. 35–37; Robson, M., *Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars: Alliances and Diplomacy in Economic Maritime Conflict* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2011), pp. 196-8,

[15] See John Lynch, 'British Policy and Spanish America, 1783–1808', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, (Vol. 1, Nr. 01, 1969), pp. 1-30.

[16] See Rory Muir, *Britain and the defeat of Napoleon 1807-1815* (London: Yale University Press, 1996), pp. 35–37.

[17] See Miguel Artola, *Los orígenes de la España contemporánea* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1959), pp. 120-22.

[18] See John H Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World – Britain and Spain in America 1492-1830* (London: Yale University Press, 2007); D. A. Brading, *The first America: the Spanish monarchy, Creole patriots, and the Liberal state 1492-1867* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); José María Portillo Valdés, *Crisis atlántica: autonomía e independencia en la crisis de la monarquía hispana* (Madrid: Marcial Pons Historia, 2006).

[19] See Felipe Fernández-Armesto, *The Americas: the history of a hemisphere* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003); Anthony Pagden, *Spanish imperialism and the political imagination: studies in European and Spanish-American social and political theory, 1513-1830* (London: Yale University Press, 1998).

[21] Juan Pérez Villamil, *Carta sobre el modo de establecer el Consejo de Regencia del Reino con arreglo a nuestra Constitución* (Madrid: Imprenta de la Hija de Ibarra, 1808), p. 9.

[22] See José María Portillo Valdés, *Crisis atlántica: autonomía e independencia en la crisis de la monarquía hispana* (Madrid: Marcial Pons Historia, 2006), p. 67.

[23] Charles J. Esdaile, *The Duke of Wellington and the command of the Spanish army, 1812-14* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), p. 90.

[24] See María Cruz Seoane, *El primer lenguaje constitucional español: las Cortes de Cádiz (*Madrid: , Editorial Moneda y Crédito, 1968), pp. 158–59. Vicente Lloréns Castillo, *Literatura, historia, política (ensayos)* (Madrid: Ediciones de la Revista de Occidente, 1967), pp. 45–51.

[25] Carr, *Spain, 1808-1939,* pp. xvi, 94.

[26] See Jeremy Adelman, *Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic* (Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 176.

[27] Erik Lars Myrup, 'Kings, Colonies, and Councillors: Brazil and the Making of Portugal's Overseas Council, 1642-1833', *The Americas* (Vol. 67, No. 2, 2010), p. 217.

[28] Fernando Dores Costa, 'Army Size, Military Recruitment and Financing in Portugal during the Period of the Peninsular War 1808–1811', *e-Journal of Portuguese History* (Vol. 6, No. 2, 2008), pp. 1–27.

[29] Graciela Iglesias Rogers, *British Liberators in the Age of Napoleon: Volunteering under the Spanish flag in the Peninsular War* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), p. 151.

[30] See Ronald Fraser, *Napoleon's cursed war: Spanish popular resistance in the Peninsular war, 1808-1814* (London: Verso, 2008), pp. 466-521.

[35] See *An Account of the Battle of Waterloo ... By a British officer on the staff. With an appendix containing the British, French, Prussian, and Spanish official details, etc* (London: James Ridgway, 1815), pp. 46, 98, 101, 104; Archivo Militar General de Segovia (Spain), Expediente M-3253 Nicolás Giorgeti Minisuir (Minuisir).

[36] See Timothy E Anna, 'The Buenos Aires Expedition and Spain's Secret Plan to Conquer Portugal, 1814–1820', *The Americas* (Vol. 34, No. 3, 1978), pp. 356–80.

[37] See Matthew Brown, *Adventuring through Spanish Colonies: Simón Bolivar, Foreign Mercenaries and the Birth of New Nations* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2006); Iglesias Rogers, *British Liberators in the Age of Napoleon*, pp. 158-65.

[38] D. A. G. Waddell, 'British Neutrality and Spanish-American Independence: The Problem of Foreign Enlistment', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, (Vol. 19, Nr. 1, 1987), pp. 1-18.

[39] Klaus Gallo, *Great Britain and Argentina: from invasion to recognition, 1806-26* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 141-164.